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Public - Interview with John Maszka- Author of Terrorism and the Bush Doctrine



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Thread Title: Interview with John Maszka- Author of Terrorism and the Bush Doctrine


Posted by
Sharonfahreed
Msg # 1943


Posts: 1
Joined: Jun 2008

Thu June 05, 2008 9:29 AM, Msg # 1943

Sharon Fahreed: Why did you decide to study international terrorism?

John Maszka: Actually, my emphasis is on American foreign policy as it impacts international terrorism. I’m very interested in what I consider to be one of the most dynamic periods of American foreign policy.

Sharon Fahreed: The Bush administration.

John Maszka: Precisely.

Sharon Fahreed: What do you feel is the most important aspect of this period?

John Maszka: The three pillars of the Bush Doctrine- unilateralism, military hegemony, and preventive war. I’ve concluded in my research that these three elements of foreign policy are strategic elements of American foreign policy under George W. Bush. That is to say that they are policy, not just options.

Sharon Fahreed: Would you say they are the Bush administration’s preferred policy?

John Maszka: It certainly appears to be the case.

Sharon Fahreed: Why is that do you suppose?

John Maszka: You know it’s peculiar, because George W. Bush campaigned in 2000 against nation-building, and then shortly thereafter turned into one of the greatest neoconservatives in American history. Also, Rice was a staunch realist prior to 9/11.

Sharon Fahreed: Do you suppose 9/11 had a part to play?

John Maszka: It more-or-less had to have a huge impact on the administration’s strategies. Unless, of course, you’re a conspiracy theorist; in which case you’d believe that the Bush administration was somehow behind 9/11 (smiles).

Sharon Fahreed: And are you?

John Maszka: Fortunately for me, my research avoids that very sensitive issue. Let’s just suffice it to say that after the way the Bush administration handled Afghanistan and Iraq, very little would surprise me.

Sharon Fahreed: What do you suggest as a solution to terrorism?

John Maszka: Well, a solution is a rather tall order. I prefer to consider my model as an approach to beginning to address terrorism. In my research of terrorism, I have discovered that there is no uniform definition of terrorism, nor is there any general agreement on the causes of terrorism, nor is there any one accepted method of collecting data on individual acts of terrorism. Interestingly enough however, with very few exceptions, nearly all scholars, journalists and security professionals alike agree that counter-terrorists measures require a great deal of diplomacy. I have concluded that while some minimal definition is necessary to identify terrorism in a uniform manner, knowing what causes terrorism and collecting data on individual acts of terrorism is not as important as knowing how to stop it. When putting out a fire, while it is important to know what type of fire it is before attempting to put it out (e.g. applying water to an oil fire will have the same effect as using a flame thrower), firefighters understand that the key to putting out any fire is to remove its source of oxygen. This knowledge affords them a standard plan of action that varies only in detail (what kind of fire is it, and what is needed to remove the source of oxygen).
Likewise, terrorism depends on popular support to sustain itself. Without popular support, the majority of funding, recruits and overall acceptance will disappear. Therefore, similar to putting out a fire, the primary goal for eliminating terrorism is to eliminate the sources of popular support. This has to be our standard approach and strategy. The specific details as to how to eliminate popular support for terrorism will vary from situation to situation depending on the type of terrorism, and what is causing it; but we now have a standard solution. This standard solution will require a variety of diplomatic measures, as the specific reasons for popular support of terrorism will vary from country to country. But I believe that all efforts in countering terrorism must begin with a measure of popular support for terrorism. If popular support for terrorism is high (50% or greater), diplomatic steps to lower it, whatever these may be, must be taken. This indeed will take a great deal of diplomacy. If popular support for terrorism is low, but steadily growing, this too will need to be addressed to lower popular support for terrorism through diplomatic measures, before new terrorist cells form, and acts of terrorism spread into new locations. This model should not only devise a standard plan of action for countering terrorism, but it should also provide a means for tracking growing support for terrorism in societies, that as of yet, have not been openly producing or sponsoring terrorists or terrorist activities.
Measuring popular support for terrorism may or may not be as straight forward as just surveying members of the population, as these surveys may or may not reflect the true public opinion (people may be reluctant to admit that they are supportive of certain acts of terrorism or that they sympathize with terrorists’ goals and/or motivations). Likewise, in areas where open support for terrorism has not yet manifest itself, potential support for terrorism may more clearly be measured through a disdain for the hegemon (the United States) and its policies. I’ve devised a very simple formula to test the survey results. Low popular opinion rates for the hegemon (LPOH) and high levels of perceived interference (HLPI) from that hegemon should also produce higher popular support for terrorism: (HPST). LPOH + HLPI = HPST. Hence, if 50% or more of the population openly support terrorism, terrorism should already be an existing product of that society. If less than 50% of the population openly supports terrorism, but 50% or more shares both a low opinion of the hegemon and high levels of perceived interference from the hegemon, terrorism should also be an existing product of that society. If less than 50% of the population openly supports terrorism, and 50% or less shares a low opinion of the hegemon and high levels of perceived interference from the hegemon, but these percentages are growing, terrorism is a potential product of that society.
Application of this formula will afford us three opportunities: 1) to eliminate popular support for terrorism in societies where such popular support exits; 2) to detect the potential for popular support of terrorism in societies where it has not yet manifest itself, and 3) to identify the various causes for popular support of terrorism in any given society as revealed through the popular perception of the hegemon.

Sharon Fahreed: That's so simple and yet insightful.

John Maszka: Thank you. Now we just need to find an administration that will actually pursue it.

Sharon Fahreed: Well, good luck with that. And good luck with your new book Terrorism and the Bush Doctrine. Thank you for being with us today.

John Maszka: Thank you Sharon. It's been my pleasure.


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